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 BAYESIAN AND CONSISTENT ASSESSMENTS∗
CARLOS PIMIENTA†
ABSTRACT. In a Bayesian assessment beliefs are computed from the
strategy proﬁle following Bayes’ rule at positive probability information
sets and for every subgame. We characterize the set of extensive-forms
(extensive-form games without a payoff assignment) for which the sets
of Bayesian assessments and consistent assessments coincide. In do-
ing so we disentangle the different restrictions imposed by consistency
across information sets.
1. INTRODUCTION
A sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) is a sequentially ra-
tional consistent assessment. The notion of consistency incorporated in the
deﬁnition of sequential equilibrium provides a way of selecting beliefs at
zero probability information sets. Loosely speaking, consistent beliefs must
admit an explanation consisting of “small trembles” made to reach those in-
formation sets.
Thereisabroadtheoreticalliteraturedealingwithsequentialequilibrium.
This partly stems from the apparently ad-hoc procedure whereby consis-
tency selects beliefs, which urged an effort to understand better the no-
tion of consistency and its game theoretical implications. Swinkels (1993),
Battigalli (1996) and Kohlberg and Reny (1997) show that consistency is
related to the game theoretical principle of strategic indepencence. If dif-
ferent players choose their strategies independently then their assessments
must be consistent.
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FIGURE 1.
A number of papers also offer different characterizations of consistency
and/or show that, under certain conditions, sequential equilibrium is equiv-
alent to weaker equilibrium concepts. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) deﬁne
perfect Bayesian equilibrium imposing some intuitive restrictions on beliefs
and show its equivalence to sequential equilibrium in multi-period games
with observable actions. Perea y Monsuwé, Jansen, and Peters (1997) pro-
vide an algebraic characterization of consistency without making use of
trembles. Litan and Pimienta (2008) ﬁnd the maximal class of extensive-
forms such that sequential equilibrium and subgame perfection coincide in
equilibrium strategies and equilibrium outcomes.
In this paper we look at those instances where consistency places no re-
strictions at zero probability information sets. For simplicity, we restrict
ourselves to ﬁnite extensive-form games without proper subgames. This
is motivated by the observation that the set of consistent assessments of a
subgame coincides with the projection of the set of consistent assessments
for the entire game on those coordinates corresponding to the subgame; and
that every consistent assessment of the subgame of is part of some consis-
tent assessment for the entire game. Apart from this restriction, we do not
impose any further structure on the extensive-form games other than perfect
recall.
To introduce the reader to the nature of the results and the characteriza-
tions that we shall derive consider the extensive-form of Figure 1. We refer
to it as extensive-form and not as extensive-form game because it lacks a
payoff assignment. (Hence, in the sequel, whenever payoffs are not yet
speciﬁed we talk about extensive-forms and subforms instead of extensive-
form games and subgames.) If Player I moves Out then any belief at Player
II’s information set is consistent as it can be justiﬁed by an appropriate
sequence of trembles. A similar argument holds in the extensive-form of
Figure 2. If players I and II play according to (r1,r2) then arbitrary beliefs
at Player III’s information set are consistent.
To formalize these ideas, we deﬁne Bayesian assessments by imposing
the only requirement that beliefs at positive probability information sets
are computed from the strategy proﬁle using Bayes’ rule. Clearly, every
consistent assessment is a Bayesian assessment and in general, not every
Bayesian assessment is consistent. Our objective is to characterize the set
of extensive-forms without proper subforms such that every Bayesian as-
sessments is consistent. Consider again the extensive-forms of Figure 1 and3
Figure2. InFigure1(Figure2)wheneverPlayerII’sinformationset(Player
III’s information set) is reached with positive probability, Bayes’ rule fully
determines beliefs at that information set; and whenever that information
set is reached with zero probability, arbitrary beliefs are guaranteed to be
consistent.
It is not difﬁcult to come up with examples of extensive-forms for
which some Bayesian assessment is not consistent. This is the case of the
extensive-form in Figure 3 and the Bayesian assessment (Out,l2,R,m(x2)=
1). The reason is that consistent beliefs should place probability zero at the
centralnodeofPlayerIII’sinformationsetgiventhatinasequentialequilib-
rium “correlation in defections are (partially) ruled out” (Kreps and Wilson,
1982, p. 875). That is, if Player I defects, it does not make a defection of
Player II more likely.
Figure 5 contains another example. Kreps and Wilson (1982, p. 876)
explain how the consistency criterion invokes the “common knowledge”
principle for beliefs. Hence, any assessment where Player I moves Out
and players II and III assess different relative probabilities over their left-
hand and right-hand nodes is not consistent. The current work identiﬁes the
relevant characteristic shared by the extensive-forms in ﬁgures 3, 5, and any
other extensive form where consistency selects a strict subset of Bayesian
assessments. In identifying this characteristic we will also disentangle the
different restrictions imposed by consistency across information sets.
There are practical reasons why we think that this type of result is worth
exploring. Mainly, the characterizations derived here can be useful when
it comes to economic applications. They are based on extensive-forms and
quite easy to verify. Furthermore, they can be interpreted as a delineation
of the cases where arbitrary off-equilibrium beliefs are guaranteed to be
consistent. In the last section we show some modiﬁcation of the the results
that serve this purpose.
Additionally, this paper can help understand better how consistency
brings about restriction in beliefs. While in some cases we may already
have a very good understanding about how consistent beliefs are shaped, as
it happens for instance when one information set comes after another like in
Figure 5, in some other cases this relation may be more obscure or, at least,






















For this reason, a unifying explanation of the restrictions on beliefs entailed
by consistency that is based solely on the characteristics of extensive-forms
can be of theoretical interest.
In the next section we introduce the basic notation of extensive-form
games and important deﬁnitions. Section 3 contains the results illustrated
by a series of examples. Proofs are offered in Section 4. Section 5 is con-
cerned with the relationship between sequentially rational Bayesian assess-
ments and sequential equilibria. Section 6 concludes and shows some prac-
tical implications of the results.
2. BASIC NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
Westartbydescribingsomenecessarynotationandterminologyforﬁnite
extensive-form games with perfect recall. We decompose an extensive-form
game into its extensive-form and the payoff assignment. Our characteriza-
tions are stated in terms of extensive-forms. As we mentioned in the intro-
duction we focus on extensive-forms without proper subforms.2
The set of players is N = {0,1,...,N}. Player 0 ∈ N corresponds to
Nature. We index players other than Nature with the letter n = 1,...,N.
The set of nodes in the tree is represented by X and the set of ﬁnal nodes
by Z. The collection of information sets of player n is Hn. An element
h ∈Hn represents the set of nodes that player n cannot distinguish when she
has to move at h. The information set that contains node x is denoted as
h(x). Furthermore, H =
 
nHn.
The set of actions available at the information set h is A(h). We use
the terms action and choice interchangeably. We denote as A =
 
hA(h)
the complete set of actions across information sets. Therefore, the A(h)’s
partition A. If player n chooses action a∈A(h), h∈Hn, when at node x∈h,
the next node being reached is denoted by t(x,a).
2 The terms “extensive-form” and “subform” are taken from Kreps and Wilson (1982).
Kreps and Wilson, however, obtain an extensive-form game from an extensive-form by
specifying an assignment of payoffs to ending nodes together with a strictly positive prob-
ability measure over the set of initial nodes (i.e. Nature’s initial move). We incorporate the
probabilities associated to Nature’s moves into the extensive-form.5
Given any node, there is a unique sequence of choices that from the root
of the extensive-form lead to that node. That sequence of choices is called
path to node x and it is denoted by P(x).
An extensive-form game is obtained from an extensive-form by specify-
ing for each player n a Bernoullian utility function un : Z → R. Once we
ﬁx an extensive-form, an extensive-form game is given by N Bernoullian
utility functions and it can be seen as a point in RN|Z|.
The set of player n’s pure strategies Sn is the set of all functions sn :
Hn → A such that sn(h) ∈ A(h) for all information sets h in Hn. The set
of pure strategy proﬁles is S = S1 ×   ×SN. We write S(x) and S(h) to
denote the set of pure strategy proﬁles that reach, respectively, node x and
information set h. The sets Sn(x) and S−n(x) are the projections of S(x) on
Sn and S−n = Õm =nSm.
A behavioral strategy proﬁle s is a sequence of functions s(  | h) :
A(h) → [0,1], one for each h ∈ H, satisfying åa∈A(h)s(a | h) = 1 for all h.
In turn, a system of beliefs m is a sequence of functions m(  | h) : h → [0,1],
one for each h ∈ H, satisfying åx∈hm(x | h) = 1 for all h. An assessment is
a strategy proﬁle together with a system of beliefs (s,m).
We now introduce our two objects of study.
Deﬁnition 1 (Consistent Assessments). The assessment (s,m) is consistent
if it is the limit point of a sequence {(st,mt)}¥
t=0 such that, for all t, st is
completely mixed (i.e. st(a | h) > 0 for all h ∈ H and all a ∈ A(h)) and mt
is derived from st using Bayes’ rule.
Deﬁnition 2 (Bayesian Assessments). The assessment (s,m) is a Bayesian
assessment if if the value of m at information sets reached with positive
probability is computed from s using Bayes’ rule.
Of course, every consistent assessment is a Bayesian assessment.
3. NON-CONSISTENT BAYESIAN ASSESSMENTS
In this section we characterize the set of extensive forms such that the
set of consistent assessments is a strict subset of the set of Bayesian assess-
ments. This is done in propositions 1 and 3. Theorem 1 will later assert
that in the complement of the set laid out by the propositions the sets of
Bayesian and consistent assessments coincide.
To provide a more clear intuition about the results let us introduce relative
probabilities over the set S of pure strategy proﬁles.3 A relative probability
on S speciﬁes the relative weight of each subset of pure strategy proﬁles
3 Relative probabilities are equivalent to the notion of conditional probability sys-
tems (Myerson, 1986). In game theory conditional probability systems arise naturally
from the need of specifying probabilities conditional on events that have prior probabil-
ity zero. Among others, conditional probability systems have been studied by Myerson
(1986); McLennan (1989a,b); Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel (1991); Swinkels (1993);
Hammond (1994); Battigalli (1996); and Kohlberg and Reny (1997)6
with respect to any other subset. This includes subsets having prior proba-
bility equal to zero. A relative probability r on S must satisfy the following:
for every subset Q ⊂ S and all nonempty subsets R, T ⊂ S,
(i) r(Q,R) ∈ [0,¥],
(ii) r(Q,Q) = 1,
(iii) r(Q,T)+r(R,T) = r(Q∪R,T) if Q∩R = ∅, and
(iv) r(Q,T) = r(Q,S)r(S,T), whenever the product does not involve
both 0 and ¥.
Standard prior probabilities are therefore given by r( ,S).
Battigalli (1996) and Kohlberg and Reny (1997) show that every consis-
tent assessment can be generated, in a way speciﬁed below, by a relative
probability deﬁned over the set of pure strategy proﬁles and satisfying a
strong independence property. Strong independence implies weak indepen-
dence and, for our purposes, the latter concept is restrictive enough. The
relative probability r deﬁned over S is weakly independent if for every two
nonempty Cartesian subsets Q, R ⊂ S and every player n ∈ N ,4
r(Qn×Q−n,Rn×Q−n) = r(Qn×R−n,Rn×R−n).
Every consistent assessment (s,m) can be generated by a relative proba-
bility r satisfying weak independence according to:5
s(a | h) = r(S(t(x,a)),S(h)) for any x ∈ h;and, (3.1)
m(x | h) = r(S(x),S(h)). (3.2)
It can be shown that perfect recall and weak independence imply that (3.1)
is well deﬁned (i.e. it does not depend on the choice of x ∈ h).
We are going to derive a condition that implies restrictions on consistent
beliefs at zero probability information sets. Recall that the path to a node
x, denoted by P(x), is the collection of actions that from the root of the
extensive-form lead to that node. Consider two nodes x and y that have
a common action ¯ a ∈ P(x)∩P(y) in their respective paths. Let s be
a pure behavioral strategy proﬁle that takes action ¯ a with probability zero
and every other action in the path to x with probability one. Even though
under s both nodes x and y occur with probability zero, intuitively, node y
cannot be inﬁnitely more likely than node x. Let us now offer a more formal
argument.
Let r an independent relative probability deﬁned on S that induces the
consistent assessment (s,m) where s is as above. We denote ss the pure
4 Swinkels (1993) calls this condition individual quasi-independence. It is the (weak)
notion of independence considered by Kohlberg and Reny (1997). He uses the term quasi-
independence for the analogous condition when more than one coordinate is allowed to
change. This is the independence condition used by Battigalli (1996). Quasi-independence
implies individual quasi-independence but the opposite is not true. Swinkels (1993) offers
an example, credited to Myerson, at that effect.
5 The converse is not true, i.e. not every weakly independent relative probability system
generates a consistent assessment. See Kohlberg and Reny (1997) for an example.7
strategy proﬁle which is equivalent to s. Let Player n be the player that
moves at the information set ¯ h where the choice ¯ a is available. Owing
to independence, the relative probability r(S(x),S(y)) must be equal to
r(S(x)−n ×{ss
n},S(y)−n ×{ss
n}). Moreover, r(S(x)−n ×{ss
n},S) > 0 be-
cause one element in S(x)−n ×{ss
n}, the pure strategy proﬁle ss, receives
strictly positive prior probability. Therefore, r(S(x)−n ×{ss
n },S(y)−n ×
{ss
n}) > 0 and consequently r(S(x),S(y)) > 0. That is, node y is not inﬁn-
itelymorelikelythannodex. Now, ifxandybelongtothesameinformation
set h then S(x) and S(y) are subsets of S(h) and we obtain r(S(y),S(h))<1.
Furthermore, if the information set h is reached with probability zero under
s the last inequality and (3.2) imply m(y | h) < 1.
Consider again the extensive-form of the game in Figure 3. The leftmost
node and the central node in Player III’s information set have a common
choice, action l1, in their respective paths. If players I and II play according
to (Out,l2) then (Out,l2) is inﬁnitely more likely than (Out,m). We can use
independence to conclude that the proﬁle (l1,l2) is inﬁnitely more likely
than (l1,m), i.e. the leftmost node in Player III’s information set is inﬁnitely
more likely than the central node. Since Player I plays Out, Player III’s
information set is reached with probability zero and we need to specify
beliefs at her information set. It follows that consistent beliefs must assign
probability zero to that central node. This restriction does not apply to
Bayesian assessments.
We start our characterization with a sufﬁcient condition for an extensive-
form to have Bayesian assessments that are not consistent. It corresponds
to the set of properties suggested above and in our analysis of Figure 3.
Proposition 1. Consider an extensive-form without proper subgames. Sup-
pose that we can ﬁnd an information set h with two distinct nodes x and y
and a pure behavioral strategy proﬁle s such that the following conditions
hold:
(i) the information set h is reached with probability zero under s; and
(ii) there exists one action ¯ a∈P(x)∩P(y) that satisﬁes s(¯ a| ¯ h)=0.
Then the set of consistent assessments is strictly contained in the set of
Bayesian assessments.
Property (i) above is clear. The sets of Bayesian and consistent assess-
ments may differ only if some information set receives probability zero. It
also shows that relative probabilities are only part of the story. Not only do
we need a behavioral strategy proﬁle that reveals a likelihood ordering be-
tween two nodes, but also one that at the same time reaches the information
set containing these two nodes with probability zero.
Property (ii) captures the relevant features in Figure 3. To understand bet-
ter why we need an action ¯ a∈P(x)∩P(y) observe that in ﬁgures 1 and 2,
where every Bayesian assessment is consistent, we cannot ﬁnd two nodes
in the same information set that have a common action in their respective
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FIGURE 4.
Figure 4 and a behavioral strategy proﬁle that assigns probability one to
(l,Out). There is no restriction on how Player III should form her con-
sistent beliefs. (Every conceivable belief vector at that information set is
the limit of a sequence of conditional probabilities generated by an ap-
propriately chosen sequence of trembles.) In this case, for any system of
beliefs m, the resulting assessment can be associated to a well deﬁned inde-
pendent relative probability system on the set of pure strategy proﬁles—and
every Bayesian assessment is consistent.
It is worthwhile pointing out that it is enough to ﬁnd one behavioral strat-
egy proﬁle that, together with the extensive-form under consideration, sat-
isﬁes all three properties in Proposition 1 for us to know that there are non-
consistent Bayesian assessments. However, nothing guarantees that every
strategy proﬁle satisfying these three properties is part of one of such as-
sessments. To see this we can combine the extensive-forms in ﬁgures 3 and
4 so that both players I and II can move out. A strategy proﬁle where, in-
deed, both Players I and Player II move out satisﬁes the three properties.
However, arbitrary beliefs at player III’s information set are consistent.
Figure 5 is another example where the set of consistent assessment is a
strict subset of the set of Bayesian assessments. Consistency implies com-
mon knowledge of beliefs. This means that Player II and Player III must
have the same belief over their left-hand and right-hand nodes and that, con-
sequently, not every Bayesian assessment is consistent. In order to see this
in terms of Proposition 1 note that action r2 belongs to the path of the two
nodes in Player III’s information set.
The strategy proﬁle (Out,l2,X) is one of the strategies that Proposition 1
demands. But the behavioral strategy proﬁle (Out,r2,L) does not satisfy
property (ii) above and yet it does not admit arbitrary Bayesian beliefs to
form consistent assessments. This suggests that we should explore further
how the values assumed by consistent beliefs at two different information
sets relate to each other. We start this analysis studying signaling games,
where it is well known that sequential equilibrium does not impose restric-
tions on beliefs.6 Once Nature moves, the sender observes her type and
sends a signal to the receiver. If the receiver observes a signal which is
sent in equilibrium, she applies Bayes’ rule to derive her beliefs about the
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FIGURE 5.
type of the sender. If a signal is not sent in equilibrium, the receiver has
no restrictions whatsoever to form her beliefs about the type of the sender
upon receiving that signal. Note well that every pair of nodes that belong
to the same information set have completely different paths from each other
because “identical” signals can come from different types.
Consider the extensive-form of a slightly modiﬁed signaling game in Fig-
ure 6.7 After the sender learns her type, and before she sends a signal, she
can end the game. As it is the case in a standard signaling game, no pair
of nodes that belong to the same information set have a common action
in their respective paths. Nonetheless, there are actions that are common
to the paths to nodes that belong to different information sets. That is,
C1 ∈ P(x1)∩P(y2) and C2 ∈ P(x2)∩P(y1). Consider the behavioral
strategy proﬁle (F1,F2,U1,D2,RU,L2) which assigns probability zero to C1
andC2. As mentioned previously, if a strategy proﬁle assigns positive prob-
ability to all the actions leading to a node but one, which is also in the path
to a second node, then the underlying independent relative probability must
consider the (set of pure strategy proﬁles leading to the) ﬁrst node as inﬁn-
itely more likely than the second node. In terms of the example this means
r(S(x1),S(y2)) = r(S(x2),S(y1)) = ¥ which in turn implies that we can-
not have r(S(y1),S(x1)) = r(S(y2),S(x2)) = ¥ because otherwise a node
must be inﬁnitely more likely than itself. From this argument we obtain that
a consistent assessment with a behavioral strategy proﬁle as above cannot
display beliefs such that m(y1 | h1) = m(y2 | h2) = 1. This restriction does
not apply to Bayesian assessments.
The relevant features of the previous example are generalized in the next
proposition into a new sufﬁcient condition on extensive-forms so that the
set of consistent assessments is a strict subset of the set of Bayesian assess-
ments.
Proposition 2. Consider an extensive-form without proper subforms. Sup-
pose that we can ﬁnd two distinct information sets h1, h2, four distinct nodes
7 The extensive-form of this game is a simpliﬁed version of the one in Figure 235.1 in






















x1, y1, x2, y2 and a pure behavioral strategy proﬁle s such that the following
conditions hold:
(i) x1, y1 ∈ h1 and x2, y2 ∈ h2;
(ii) the information sets h1 and h2 are reached with probability zero
under s; and
(iii) we can ﬁnd actions ¯ a1 ∈ P(x1)∩P(y2) and ¯ a2 ∈ P(x2)∩P(y1)
that satisfy s(¯ a1 | ¯ h1) = s(¯ a2 | ¯ h2) = 0.
Then the set of consistent assessments is strictly contained in the set of
Bayesian assessments.
Remark 1. (i) If h1 = h2 then we can apply Proposition 1. However, it
is important that x1  = y1 and x2  = y2. In particular, ¯ a1 ∈ P(x1)∩
P(x2) and ¯ a2 ∈ P(x2)∩P(y1) together with s(¯ a1 | ¯ h1) = s(¯ a2 |
¯ h2) = 0 do not guarantee that some Bayesian assessments is not
consistent. Note as well that the last two inclusions do not imply
P(x1)∩P(y1)  = ∅, hence, we cannot apply Proposition 1 in this
case.
(ii) Having two actions ¯ a1 and ¯ a2 is also necessary. Suppose that in the
extensive-form of Figure 6 we delete actionC2 and replace the two
consecutive information sets of Player I by a single information set
where Player I has available the three choices F2,U2 and D2. With
this modiﬁcation every Bayesian assessment is consistent.
In our signaling game the two zero probability information do not come
one after the other as it occurs, for instance, in the extensive-form of Fig-
ure 5. We have seen that this extensive-form satisﬁes the conditions of
Proposition 1, therefore, we already know that some Bayesian assessments
are not consistent. We can now see that this extensive-form also satisﬁes the
conditions of Proposition 2. Indeed, if Player I moves Out, then Player II’s
information set and Player III’s information set are reached with probabil-
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FIGURE 7.
in III’s information set have action l2 in their respective paths. The analo-
gous is true for the right-hand nodes and action r2. Note, nevertheless, that
if moving Out was not a possible action the resulting extensive-form would
satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1, but not the conditions of Proposi-
tion 2.
Similar arguments to those in our previous two examples are also valid
when three or more information sets are involved. Figure 7 illustrates this
with three information sets. Consider that players I and II play according
to (Out,R1,R2,R3). We must specify beliefs at the three information sets of
Player III. The following pairs of nodes have an action in their respective
paths that the previous proﬁle attaches probability zero: (x1,y2), (x2,y3)
and (x3,y1). Weak independence implies that, for each of these pairs, the
pure strategy proﬁle leading to the ﬁrst node is inﬁnitely more likely than
the pure strategy proﬁle leading to the second node. It follows that a system
of beliefs such that m(y1 |h1)= m(y2 |h2)= m(y3 |h3)=1 is not consistent.
Again, this restriction does not apply to Bayesian assessments.
The extensive-form of Figure 7 is such that no two information sets
receiving probability zero come one after another. Figure 8 contains an
extensive-form where for some information sets this is the case. For rea-
sons analogous to those discussed in the previous examples, the assessment
(Out,L1,L2,m(y1 | h1) = 1,m(y2 | h2) = 1,m(y3 | h3) = 1,m(y4 | h4) = 1) is
not consistent.8
The general result, which subsumes Proposition 2, is the following:9
Proposition 3. Consider an extensive-form without proper subforms. Sup-
pose that we can ﬁnd K ≥ 2 distinct information sets h1,...,hK, 2K distinct
8 One small difference is that in this example S(y1) and S(x2) are of the same “order of
magnitude”, i.e. neither set is inﬁnitely more likely than the other because L1 is chosen by
the strategy proﬁle with probability one. The same is true for S(y3) and S(x4).
9 Nonetheless, we present propositions 2 and 3 separately to facilitate the exposition of
the results. On a technical note, the proof of the Proposition 3 is done by induction (see












nodes x1,y1,...,xK,yK and a pure behavioral strategy proﬁle s such that
the following conditions hold:
(i) for each i = 1,...,K nodes xi and yi belong to hi;
(ii) the information sets h1,...,hk are reached with probability zero
under s; and
(iii) for each i = 1,...,K − 1 we can ﬁnd and action ¯ ai ∈ P(xi) ∩
P(yi+1) that satisﬁes s(¯ ai | ¯ hi) = 0, likewise, there is an action
¯ aK ∈ P(xK)∩P(y1) such that s(¯ aK | ¯ hK) = 0.
Then the set of consistent assessments is strictly contained in the set of
Bayesian assessments.
Remark 2. (i) Proposition 2 corresponds to K = 2.
(ii) It is embedded in the statement of the proposition that we have to
ﬁnd K information sets and an order of those information sets such
that the condition are true. The conditions do not need to hold for
every possible order.
(iii) Again, it is important that the 2K nodes be distinct. However,
if some of the K information sets are not different it would only
mean that the conditions are satisﬁed for an integer strictly smaller
than K.
(iv) If the conditions are satisﬁed for some value of K it does not follow
that they are also satisﬁed for some integer smaller than K. See for
instance, Figure 7 where K = 3 and Figure 8 where K = 4. In both
cases the conditions do not hold for smaller values of K.
Theorem 1 states that the conditions in propositions 1 and 3 are not only
sufﬁcient but also necessary.
Theorem 1. Consider an extensive-form without proper subforms where
some Bayesian assessments is not consistent. Then the extensive-form sat-
isﬁes either the conditions listed in Proposition 1 or the conditions listed in
Proposition 3.13
Intuitively, for a ﬁxed behavioral strategy proﬁle, if a zero probability
choice is in the path to two different nodes then we are losing freedom
to choose consistent beliefs because the same tremble is associated to two
different nodes. The fact that the conditions in propositions 1 and 3 are
not satisﬁed means that we always have enough freedom so that arbitrary
beliefs are consistent.
Take a behavioral strategy proﬁle s and two nodes x and y. Suppose that
there is at least one choice in the path to x that is not in the path to y and at
least one choice in the path to y that is not in the path to x. Suppose further
that none of these two choices is taken with positive probability under s.
Based only in this information about s and the structure of the extensive-
form we cannot derive a deﬁnite likelihood ordering between nodes x and
y. Recurring to an argument based on trembles, we can ﬁne-tune the trem-
bles associated to the two actions pinpointed before to make one of the
sequences of trembles necessary to reach one of the nodes as likely as we
want with respect to the other. If x and y are the only nodes in the same
information set h and this is reached with probability zero under s then we
can freely choose consistent beliefs at h.
If the conditions in Proposition 1 are not satisﬁed the above argument
holds even if we have more than two nodes in h and for any s. So consis-
tent beliefs at h can be freely chosen. But this choice of beliefs could, in
principle, constrain the set of consistent beliefs available for a second zero
probability information set h′. This can happen when one of the choices
whose tremble we ﬁne-tuned before is in the path to some node in h′. If
the conditions in Proposition 3 are not satisﬁed for K = 2 then for each of
the remaining nodes in that information set we can again ﬁne-tune some
tremble associated to a choice that is only in the path to that node and none
else in h′. The argument can be repeated again for a third zero probability
information set h′′ but if the conditions in Proposition 3 are not satisﬁed
for K = 3 we do not have restrictions in choosing beliefs at h′′. Continu-
ing in this fashion we can pick arbitrary beliefs at every zero probability
information set.
4. PROOFS
We begin by describing some additional notation.
Given a behavioral strategy proﬁle s, its carrier C(s) is the union over
all information sets h of the choices a ∈ A that satisfy s(a | h) > 0. Fur-
thermore, a subset of choices C ⊂ A is said to be a carrier if for each infor-
mation set h it contains at least one choice in A(h). The set of all carriers
is C(S). Every carrier C ∈ C(S) has associated a set of decision nodes
that are reached with positive probability when any strategy s with carrier
C(s) = C is played. We denote that set as X+(C) and its complement as
X0(C).
Given a system of beliefs m, its support supp(m) is the union over all in-
formation sets h of the decision nodes x for which m(x | h) > 0. We reserve14
the term carrier to talk about the set of choices that receive strictly posi-
tive probability for probabilities deﬁned by strategy proﬁles, and the term
support for the analogous concept for probabilities associated to beliefs.
The main tool used in the proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 is Lemma A1
in Kreps and Wilson (1982). Before stating that lemma, some concepts are
necessary.
Alabelling isafunction L:A→Nthat mapseachchoiceaintoaninteger





Deﬁnition 3. Given a carrierC, the labelling L is said to be aC-labelling if
we have a ∈C if and only if L(a) = 0.
A basis (C,Y) is a subset of A×X. We say that the basis (C,Y) is con-
sistent if there exists at least one consistent assessment (s,m) such that
C(s) =C and supp(m) =Y.
Lemma 1 (Kreps and Wilson (1982, Lemma A1)). The basis (C,Y) is con-
sistent if and only if there is a C-labelling L such that following condition
holds:
x ∈Y if and only if x minimizes FL( ) on h(x).
For our purposes Lemma 1 implies the following. Take a behavioral
strategy proﬁle s that assigns probability zero to the information set h and
suppose that nodes x and y belong to h. If FL(x) ≤ FL(y) for every con-
ceivable C(s)-labelling L then a necessary condition for (s,m) to be con-
sistent is that m(y | h)  = 1. In order to prove Proposition 1 we show that,
if the extensive-form meets the conditions given in the proposition, we can
always ﬁnd such a strategy proﬁle or, more precisely, such a carrier.
For a behavioral strategy proﬁle s with carrier C, we are thus inter-
ested in inequalities of the form FL(x) ≤ FL(y) that remain true for every
C-labelling L. It will be useful to write F(x,C) ≤ F(y,C) when this is the
case. For instance, if node y comes after x we can readily conclude that
F(x,C) ≤ F(y,C). The expression F(x,C) ≤ F(y,C) can be meaningfully
read as “node y cannot be inﬁnitely more likely than node x under any strat-
egy proﬁle with carrier C”. If x and y belong to the same zero probability
information set this must be respected by consistent beliefs.
To avoid duplication of arguments we provide some results in the next
lemma that are used continuously throughout the proofs. Throughout, if E
and F are two arbitrary sets, we use E ⊂ F allowing for equality of the two
sets. As usual, the notation E \F represents the set of elements in E that do
not belong to F.
Lemma 2. Consider a carrier C, an information set h ⊂ X0(C), and two




\C. Let C′ =
C∪
 
P(x)\{a}), the following holds:15
(i) 0 < F(x,C′) ≤ F(y,C′);
(ii) if h  ⊂ X0(C′) then there is at least one node ˆ y ∈ h that satisﬁes





\C  = ∅, i.e. 0 < F(ˆ y,C) ≤ F(x,C).
Proof. Take a carrier C that does not contain any action a that satisﬁes a ∈
P(x)∩P(y). Suppose that under that carrier h ∈ X0(C). (Note that x and
y belong to X0(C) because a / ∈C and that we no dot necessarily assume x,
y ∈ h.) We obtain a new carrierC′ by adding toC all the choices in the path
to x except for a, therefore, we also obtain that x and y belong to X0(C′).
To prove part (i) take any C′-labelling L. Action a is the only element in
P(x) that is not inC′. Hence, FL(x) = L(a) > 0 and since a is also in P(y)
we obtain FL(y) ≥ L(a). That is, node y cannot be inﬁnitely more likely
than x under a strategy with carrier C′.
Let us turn to part (ii). Suppose now that underC′ some node in h, say ˆ y,
is reached with positive probability. As the only difference between C and
C′ is that C′ contains actions in the path to x that are not included in C that
means that x and ˆ y have common actions in their respective paths.
Part (iii) follows because every action in the path to ˆ y that is not in the
path to x is in C. Since we also have ˆ y ∈ X0(C) we obtain 0 < F(ˆ y,C) ≤
F(x,C). That is, node x cannot be inﬁnitely more likely than ˆ y under a
behavioral strategy proﬁle with carrier C′. ￿
We can prove the ﬁrst proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that h(x) represents the information set that
contains node x. The conditions listed in the proposition are equivalent to
the following set being nonempty.
F1 =
 














Using Lemma 2 (i) we obtain that F(x, ˆ C) ≤ F(y, ˆ C). If h(x) ⊂ X0( ˆ C)
then the desired result follows. If otherwise some ˆ y ∈ h(x) satisﬁes ˆ y ∈
X+( ˆ C) then Lemma 2 (iii) implies F(ˆ y,C) ≤ F(x,C). Since h(x) ⊂ X0(C)
this concludes the proof. ￿
The argument behind the proof of Proposition 2 is similar but slightly
more involved because we have to deal with nodes in two different infor-
mation sets. Given two information sets h1 and h2, we want to use the
structure of the extensive-form to ﬁnd a carrierC and four nodes x1,y1 ∈h1,
x2,y2 ∈ h2 such that F(x1,C) ≤ F(y2,C) and F(x2,C) ≤ F(y1,C). If h1 and
h2 are subsets of X0(C) then beliefs at those information sets need to be de-
termined in every assessment (s,m) with C(s) =C. Consistency implies16
that those beliefs cannot be chosen so that m(y1 | h1) = m(y2 | h2) = 1 be-
cause that would imply that for someC-labelling L it holds FL(y1) < FL(x1)
and FL(y2) < FL(x2), but necessarily we also have FL(x1) ≤ FL(y2) and
FL(x2) ≤ FL(y1). The main difﬁculty of the argument consists of show-
ing that the information sets h1 and h2 are reached with probability zero.
Lemma 2 will be of great help at this effect.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that F1 = ∅. The conditions in the propo-
sition imply that the following set is nonempty:
F2 =
 
(x1,y1,x2,y2, ¯ a1, ¯ a2,C) ∈ X4×A2×C(S) : h(x1)  = h(x2),























From Lemma 2 (i) we obtain F(x1, ˆ C) ≤ F(y2, ˆ C) and F(x2, ˆ C) ≤ F(y1, ˆ C).
If both h1 and h2 are contained in X0( ˆ C) then no consistent assessment
(s,m) with C(s) = ˆ C satisﬁes m(y1 | h1) = m(y2 | h2) = 1. So we need to
prove the result for the cases where either h1  ⊂ X0( ˆ C) or h2  ⊂ X0( ˆ C).







Now we show that h1 ⊂ X0( ˆ C1). Suppose to the contrary that h1  ⊂
X0( ˆ C1). Lemma 2 implies that some node in h1 (that is not x1) and x1 have a
common actions in their respective paths that is not contained inC. But this
would imply that the set F1 is not empty as we assumed at the beginning.
We can conclude h1 ⊂ X0( ˆ C1).
We have x1 ∈ X0( ˆ C1) because ¯ a1 does not belong to ˆ C1. If some node
in h1 does not belong to X0( ˆ C1) then this node must contain in its path a
choice that is also in the path to x1. This is because h1 ⊂ X0(C) and the
only difference between C and ˆ C1 is that the latter contains actions in the
path to x1 that are not contained in the former. However, we assumed that
F1 is empty so that we can conclude h1 ⊂ X0( ˆ C1).
We also know that ¯ a2 / ∈ ˆ C1, for otherwise ¯ a2 would be a common choice
between x1 and y1. Furthermore, ¯ a1 / ∈ ˆ C1 by construction. It follows that
x2, y2 ∈ X0( ˆ C1). Since h2  ⊂ X0( ˆ C) and F1 = ∅ we know that there is a
subset of nodes ˆ h2 ⊂ h2 that does not include x2 nor y2 and that satisﬁes
ˆ h2 ⊂ X+( ˆ C1). From Lemma 2 (iii) we obtain F(ˆ y2,C) ≤ F(x1,C) for each
ˆ y2 ∈ ˆ h2.17







By Lemma 2 (i), F(y1, ˆ C′
1) ≤ F(x2, ˆ C′
1). Using the same arguments as
before we can show that h1 ⊂ X0( ˆ C′
1) and x2, y2 ∈ X0( ˆ C′
1). If h2 ⊂ X0( ˆ C′
1)
then the desired result follows because F(ˆ y2,C) ≤ F(x1,C) keeps holding
when we change C for ˆ C′
1. That is, a consistent assessment does not satisfy
m(x1 | h1) = m(x2 | h2) = 1.
Hence, the next case we need to explore is when a subset of nodes ˆ h′
2 ⊂h2
exists such that ˆ h′
2 ⊂ X+( ˆ C′


































Let the new carrier be:
˜ C =C∪
 
˜ B\{¯ a1, ¯ a2}
 
.
We still obtain h1 ⊂ X0( ˜ C) from Lemma 2 (ii) and F1 = ∅. We obtain













if |ˆ h2| > |ˆ h′
2|.
In either case, the information set h2 is included in X0(C∗) because F1
is empty. Regarding h1, if some node ˜ x1 ∈ h1 belongs to X+(C∗) then
F(˜ x1, ˜ C) ≤ F(y2, ˜ C). Since we also have F(ˆ x2, ˜ C) ≤ F(y1, ˜ C) for every
ˆ x2 ∈ ˆ h′
2 the restriction on the values that consistent beliefs can take for strat-
egy proﬁles with carrier equal to ˜ C results. Therefore, we only need to
analyze h1 ⊂ X0(C∗) together with |ˆ h2| ≤ |ˆ h′
2| (given that the other case is
similar). Let L be an arbitrary C∗-labelling. The following holds:
SL(x1) = åˆ y2∈ˆ h2FL(ˆ y2)+L(¯ a1),
SL(y1) = åˆ x2∈ˆ h′
2FL(ˆ x2)+L(¯ a2),
SL(y2) ≥ L(¯ a1),
SL(x2) = L(¯ a2).
To understand better the ﬁrst (and the second) equality notice that, by con-
struction, the only actions in the path to x1 that do not belong to C∗ are ¯ a1
and those that we can also ﬁnd in the path to some ˆ y2 ∈ ˆ h2 (although not
necessarily all of them).
Take now a consistent assessment (s,m) with C(s) = C∗. If m(y2 |
h2) > 0 then L(¯ a1) ≤ L(¯ a2). If moreover m(ˆ y2 | h2) > 0 for all ˆ y2 ∈ ˆ h′
2 then
FL(x1) ≤ FL(y1) because |ˆ h2| ≤ |ˆ h′
2|. This completes the proof as m(y1 | h1)
cannot take a strictly positive value. ￿18
The proof of Proposition 3 is similar. Given K information sets h1,...,hK
the plan is to ﬁnd two nodes xk and yk for each information set hk so that
for some carrier C we have F(x1,C) ≤ F(y2,C),...,F(xK,C) ≤ F(y1,C).
If every hk is included in X0(C) then we cannot have FL(yk) < FL(xk) for
every k and someC-labelling L. This implies that if (s,m) is consistent and
C(s) =C then m(xk | hk)  = 1 for at least one k.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, we assume that F1 = ∅. The conditions in




(x1,y1,...,xK,yK, ¯ a1,..., ¯ ak,C) ∈ X2K ×AK ×C(S) :
h(xi)  = h(xj) for all i  = j, and for all i = 1,...K,







We proceed by induction in K assuming that for any other integer K′ <K
the set FK′ is empty. The case K = 2 was considered in Proposition 2.










From Lemma 2 (i) we obtain F(xi, ˆ C) ≤ F(yi+1, ˆ C) for every i = 1,...K.
If for every i we also obtain hi ⊂ X0( ˆ C) then a consistent assessment (s,m)
with C(s) = ˆ C cannot satisfy Õ
K
i=1m(yi | hi) = 1. Thus, we need to prove
the result when, for some i, the set hi is not included in X0( ˆ C). Let I repre-
sent the collection of indexes i such that hi  ⊂ X0( ˆ C).
Take an i ∈ I. Let ˆ hi represent the subset of those ˆ yi ∈ hi that belong
to X+( ˆ C). Nodes xi and yi do not belong to ˆ hi because ¯ ai and ¯ ai−1 are
not in ˆ C. Moreover, every action a ∈ P(ˆ yi)\C is contained in P(xi−1)
and, therefore, F(ˆ yi,C) ≤ F(xi−1,C) for all ˆ y ∈ ˆ hi. In particular no action
a ∈ P(ˆ yi)\C can be contained in some P(xk) with k  = i−1. This would











Lemma2(i)impliesF(yk, ˆ C′)≤F(xk−1, ˆ C′)foreveryk / ∈I. Furthermore,
it also implies that we still have F(ˆ yi, ˆ C′) ≤ F(xi−1, ˆ C′) for every i ∈ I and
10Throughout theproof, whentheindexiequals K, theindexi+1refersto1. Likewise,
if i = 1, the index i−1 refers to K.
11 For instance, if action a ∈ P(ˆ yi) \C belongs to P(xi−2) then FK−1 would be
nonempty. One element of this set can be obtained from our initial choice from FK by
dropping the entries corresponding to the nodes at information set hi−1 and action ai−1,
and substituting node yi by node ˆ yi and action ai−2 by action a.19
every ˆ yi ∈ ˆ hi. If all the information sets h1,...,hK are contained in X0( ˆ C′)
then we obtain that no consistent assessment whose strategy has carrier ˆ C′
can assign a belief equal to one to every decision node xk. Therefore, we
need to analyze what would happen otherwise. Let J represent the collec-
tion of indexes j such that hj  ⊂ X0( ˆ C′), furthermore, for each j ∈ J, let
ˆ h′
j ⊂ hj be the subset of nodes in hj that belong to X+( ˆ C′). The assumption

































































to construct the new carrier
(4.1) ˜ C =C∪
 
˜ B\{¯ a1,..., ¯ aK}
 
.
We can assume that every information set h1,...,hK is contained in
X0( ˜ C). To see why note that if hk  ⊂ X0( ˜ C) then there must be an ac-
tion ˜ a in the second or in the fourth component of ˜ C that is in the path
of some node ˜ xk of hk. Moreover, this node cannot be either xk or yk. Since
FK′ =∅ for every K′ <K the action ˜ a must be contained in either P(yk+1)
or P(xk−1). Consider that ˜ a∈P(yk+1) then by Lemma 2 (iii) we have that
F(˜ xk, ˆ C) ≤ F(yk+1, ˆ C) and we only need to replace xk by ˜ xk and redeﬁne I
so that it does not include k. Analogously, suppose now that ˜ a ∈ P(xk−1).
Lemma 2 (iii) implies F(˜ xk, ˆ C)≤ F(xk−1, ˆ C). We now need to replace yk by
˜ xk and remove the index k from J.
The last carrier that we consider is:12
C∗ =

        

























Suppose that Õi∈I(|ˆ hi|+1) ≥ Õj∈J(|ˆ h′
j|+1). We now show that a con-
sistent assessment (s,m) with C(s) =C∗ cannot satisfy at the same time
all of the following:
(i) for every i / ∈ I, m(yi | hi) = 1,
12 Note the sets (I−1) = {i : i+1 ∈ I} and (J+1) = {j : j−1 ∈ J}.20
(ii) for every i ∈ I, m(yi | hi) > 0 and m(ˆ yi | hi) > 0 for all ˆ yi ∈ ˆ hi,
(iii) for every i ∈ I, m(yi | hi)+åˆ yi∈ˆ hi m(ˆ yi | hi) = 1.
If the consistent assessment (s,m) satisﬁes (i), (ii) and (iii) then we
should be able to ﬁnd a C∗-labelling, say L, as in Lemma 1. Given that
the set ˜ C deﬁned in (4.1) is contained in C∗ we can write FL(xi−1) =
åˆ yi∈ˆ hiFL(ˆ yi)+FL(yi) for every i ∈ I. Additionally, (ii) and (iii) above im-
ply that SL(xi−1) = (|ˆ hi|+1)SL(yi) for every i ∈ I. A similar argument
shows that for every j ∈ J the equality SL(xj) = (|ˆ h′
j|+1)−1SL(yj+1) also
holds. The deﬁnition of C∗ for the case that we are considering entails
SL(xk) ≤ SL(yk+1) whenever k / ∈ (I−1)∪(J+1). Finally, SL(yk) < SL(xk)
for every k = 1,...,K given that we always have m(xk | hk) = 0 and






Which provides a contradiction and concludes the proof since the case
Õi∈I(|ˆ hi|+1) < Õj∈J(|ˆ h′
j|+1) is analogous. ￿
The next step is to prove that the conditions given Propositions 1 and 3
are not only sufﬁcient but also necessary. In order to prove this we need a
characterization of consistent assessments.
Lemma 3 (Kreps and Wilson (1982, Lemma A2)). Let (C,Y) be a consis-
tent basis and let (s,m) satisfy C(s) = C and supp(m) = Y. The assess-
ment (s,m) is consistent if and only if there exists a function p : A → (0,1)
such that p(a) = s(a | h) whenever s(a | h) > 0 and, moreover, for every
x ∈ X with m(x | h) > 0:











Now we can turn to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix an extensive-form that does not satisfy neither the
conditions of Proposition 1 nor the conditions of Proposition 3. Given any
carrier C a consistent basis (C,Y) always exists (Lemma 1 gives a way
of seeing this). Take a consistent assessment (s,m) with C(s) = C and
supp(m) =Y. Let L be the associated labelling and let p be a function such
as the one in equation (4.2).
The collection of non-singleton information sets h that satisfy h ⊂ X0(C)
is denoted H0. Take any information set h ∈ H0. Is is enough to prove
that for every m′ that only differs from m at information set h, i.e. satisﬁes
m′(  | h′) = m(  | h′) for every h′  = h, the assessment (s,m′) is consistent.21
First we show that if supp(m′) = supp(m) then (s,m′) is consistent.
Given the system of beliefs m′ we are going to construct a function p′ such
as the one in Lemma 3 that justiﬁes it. Fix an arbitrary node x∗ that belongs
to h and is y, the support of m and m′. Let p′(a)=p(a) for every a∈P(x∗).
For the rest of the nodes in h and Y we only modify the value taken by
p′ with respect to p for just one choice in its path. In symbols, for each
x ∈ (h∩Y)\{x∗} choose any action ax ∈ P(x)\C and let p′(a) = p(a) for
every other a ∈ P(x)\{ax}. The value of p′(ax) is given so that we adjust







Equation 4.3 may have modiﬁed the value taken by one or several choices
that are in the path to a node that is not in h. To keep track of those changes
we let the set Ah consists of those actions whose value under p′ has been
assigned by (4.3). And the set Yh consists of those nodes y that belong to
some information set in H0\{h} and that have an action in their paths that
belong to Ah. By assumption, a node inYh may contain in its path more than
one choice in Ah but Yh cannot contain two nodes that belong to the same
information set.
For each y∗ ∈Yh we maintain p′(a)=p(a) for every a∈P(y∗)\Ah. For
the rest of the nodes y ∈ h(y∗)\{y∗} that belong to Y, the support of m,
we choose any action ay ∈ P(y)\C and let p′(a) = p(a) for every other
action a ∈ P(y)\{ay}. We have to adjust the value of p′ to maintain in
the information set h(y∗) the same beliefs as in m. To do that we offset the
changes made in 4.3 so that







Again we can deﬁne the set of actions Ah(y∗) whose value under p′ has
been deﬁned by (4.4) and the set Yh(y∗) of nodes that belong to some infor-
mation set in H0\h(y∗) and that satisfy P(y)∩Ah(y∗)  = ∅. The set Ah(y∗)
does not contain two nodes from the same information set and, since the
conditions given in Proposition 3 are not met, it does not contain nodes in h
or h(y′∗) either, for any y′∗ ∈ Ah.
Since the set H0 is ﬁnite, we can continue in the same fashion until all
the actions in the paths to nodes in information sets that belong to H0
are exhausted without redeﬁning any value of p′. Finally, we have to set
p′(a) = p(a) for every unassigned a. One can check that the resulting p′
satisﬁes equation (4.2) for the system of beliefs m′.
Now we prove that for any x∗ ∈ h the basses (C,Y ∪{x∗}) and (C,Y \
{x∗}) are also consistent. We show it ﬁrst for the basis (C,Y ∪{x∗}).
Let Y′ = Y ∪{x∗}. As estated in Lemma 1 we are going to construct a
C-labelling L′ such that x ∈ Y′ if and only if x minimizes SL′( ) over h(x).
Set L′(a) = L(a) for every a ∈ P(x∗) and for the rest of the nodes x  = x∗ in22
h take an arbitrary ax ∈ P(x)\C and let
(4.5) L′(ax) = L(ax)+FL(x∗)−FL(x).
We ﬁx L′(a) = L(a) for every other action a ∈ P(x)\{ax}. That is, we are
adjusting L′ so that SL′(x) = SL′(x∗) for every x ∈Y.
We will assign the remaining values of L′ recursively. For the same rea-
sons as before, we know that no value is going to be redeﬁned. Let Ah be
the set of those actions whose value under L′ has been assigned in (4.5)
and let Yh be the set of those nodes y that belong to some information set
in H0\{h} and whose paths have an action in Ah. For each y∗ ∈Yh we ﬁx
L′(a)=L(a) for every action a∈P(y∗) and for each y∈h(y∗)\{y∗} select
an arbitrary ay ∈ P(y)\C. Let L′(a) = L(a) for every a ∈ P(y)\{ay} and






We can continue in the same fashion until we have exhausted all the actions
in the paths to the nodes that belong to some information set in H0. In order
to make L′ completely deﬁned let L′(a)=L(a) for every action that remains
unassigned. It is easy to check that the labelling L′ satisﬁes the condition
given in Lemma 1 for the basis (C,Y′).
To conclude it remains to show that for any x∗ ∈ h the basis (C,Y \{x∗})
is also consistent. Take an arbitrary ax∗ ∈ P(x∗)\C and let L′(ax∗) =
L(ax∗)+1. We ﬁx L′(a) = L(a) for every other action a ∈ P(x∗)\{ax∗} in
the path to x∗ and also for every action a ∈ P(x) in the path to any other
node x ∈ h different form x∗. The next step is to assign the values of L′ for
those actions leading to nodes contained in each information set h(y∗)∈ H0
that satisﬁes ax∗ ∈ P(y∗). Since hereafter everything is analogous to the
previous case we can conclude the proof. ￿
5. SEQUENTIALLY RATIONAL BAYESIAN ASSESSMENTS
In this section we consider extensive-form games and sequentially ra-
tional Bayesian assessments. Obviously, if for an extensive-form every
Bayesian assessment is consistent then, for every payoff vector, every se-
quentially rational Bayesian assessment is a sequential equilibrium.13 Sup-
pose that we are given an extensive-form where some Bayesian assessment
is not consistent. We want to address whether we can always ﬁnd payoffs
so that in the resulting extensive-form game sequential equilibrium reﬁnes
the set of sequentially rational Bayesian assessments.
We ﬁrst introduce some additional notation needed to deﬁne sequential
rationality. Denoteassn therestrictionofs tothoseinformationsetsowned
by Player n and denote as s−n the restriction of s to the remaining informa-
tion sets. A behavioral strategy proﬁle s induces a probability distribution
Ps on the set of ﬁnal nodes Z. The expected utility to player n is then given
13 A sequentially rational Bayesian assessment is a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium
as deﬁned by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, p. 285).23
by the expression Un(s) = åz∈ZPs(z)un(z). Let Ps
x be the probability dis-
tribution on Z if players use the strategy proﬁle s and the game starts at the
decision node x. (Note that Ps
x is always well deﬁned.) The expected util-
ity to player n from the strategy proﬁle s at the information set h given the
system of beliefs m is equal toUn(s |h,m)=åx∈hm(x | h)åz∈ZPs
x (z)un(z).
Deﬁnition 4. The assessment (s,m) is sequentially rational if at every in-
formation set h, the strategy of the player moving at information set h, say
Player n, satisﬁes
Un(s | h,m) ≥Un(s−n,s′
n | h,m) for every s′
n ∈ Sn.
The next lemma asserts that if we can ﬁnd Bayesian assessments that are
not consistent then, for some payoffs, there are behavioral strategies that are
part of sequentially rational Bayesian assessments that are not sequential
equilibrium strategies. The proof of the theorem consists of constructing
such a payoff vector.
Lemma 4. Consider an extensive-form where the set of set consistent as-
sessments is strictly contained in the set of Bayesian assessments. Then we
can ﬁnd a game with that extensive-form such that set of sequential equi-
librium strategies is a strict subset of the projection on S from the set of
sequentially rational Bayesian assessments.
Proof. Let K be such that FK  = ∅ and either FK−1 = ∅ or K = 1. Propo-
sitions 1 and 3 imply that we can ﬁnd a carrier C and K information
sets h1,...,hK that belong to X0(C) such that, for every consistent as-





åy∈ˆ hi m(y | h)
 
<1. That is, if (s,m) is a consistent assessment there
must be at least one information set hi ∈ {h1,...,hK} with at least one node
x ∈ hi\ ˆ hi that satisﬁes m(x | hi) > 0.
For each i = 1,...,K let ci be an action available at hi such that s(ci |
hi) = 0. (If at least one does not exist we only need to modify the carrier
C appropriately.) Assign a payoff equal to zero to the player who moves at
hi at every ending node that follows some action in A(hi)\{ci}. Also as-
sign a payoff equal to zero to ending nodes that follow action ci when taken
at any node in ˆ hi. Assign a payoff equal to 1 to every player elsewhere.




åy∈ˆ hi m′(y | hi)
 
= 1 is se-
quentially rational but not consistent. ￿
A possible criticism to the relevance of Lemma 4 is that (as the proof
takes advantage of) differences in strategies may only occur in those parts of
the tree reached with probability zero. In principle, we would like to show
that if some Bayesian assessment is not consistent then, for some payoffs,
sequential equilibrium selects only a strict subset from the set outcomes
generated by sequentially rational Bayesian assessments. However this may
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FIGURE 9.
Consider Figure 9. Proposition 1 together with Lemma 4 dictates that
there exists a payoff assignment such that the strategy of some sequentially
rational Bayesian assessment is not a sequential equilibrium strategy. If
Player I moves r1 at the root of the game then action l1 is taken with prob-
ability zero and it is common to the paths to the two nodes in the second
information set of Player I. Knowing this, we can assign payoffs to end-
ing nodes as described in the proof of Lemma 4. However, we cannot ﬁnd
payoffs such that the set of outcomes differ. The reason is that sequential
rationality does not let Player I deceive himself. (If we replace Player I by a
third player in her second information set then there exists a game with that
extensive-form where the sets of outcomes generated by sequentially ratio-
nal Bayesian assessments and sequential equilibria are different.14) Sup-
pose that Player I takes action r1. It is unimportant that she does not use
Player II’s strategy to construct her beliefs at her second information set as
consistency requires. Hence, if moving r1 is optimal then behavior at her
secondinformationsetisirrelevant, evenforPlayerII, whowillalwaysplay
a best response to Player I behavior because her information set is reached
with positive probability.15
A second example is Figure 5 after substituting Player III by Player II
so that she has two consecutive information sets. Again, for every assign-
ment of payoffs to ending nodes, every outcome generated by a sequentially
rational Bayesian assessment is a sequential equilibrium outcome. Note
that sequential rationality by itself may impose restrictions on beliefs at un-
reached information sets. That is, suppose that Player I moves Out and
that for some payoffs and beliefs at the ﬁrst information set of Player II
this player prefers (r2,L) to both (r2,R) and l2. Then beliefs at her second
14 From left to right assign the following payoffs to ending nodes: (0,0,1), (0,0,0),
(0,1,0), (2,1,1), (0,0,0) and (1,1,0). The outcome (1,1,0) is generated by a sequentially
rational Bayesian assessment. The unique sequential equilibrium outcome is (2,1,1).
15 Suppose that we add a move Out at the root of the extensive-form that leads to an
ending node so that if player I moves Out Player II’s information set is reached with prob-
ability zero. Give payoff (1,0) to that ending node. To the rest of ending nodes, and from
left to right, assign payoffs (0,0), (.5,0), (2,0), (2,1), (0,0) and (2,1). The sequentially
rational Bayesian assessment (Out,l2,L,m(x)=1,m(y)=1) generates outcome (1,0). But
this is not a sequential equilibrium outcome. Notice, in particular, that that assessment is
not consistent.25
information set must be such that she, in fact, prefers L to R. If otherwise
Player II prefers l2 to both (r2,L) and (r2,R) then sequential rationality does
not impose restriction on beliefs. On the other hand, consistency does not
give any degree of freedom when choosing beliefs at Player II’s second in-
formation set. This explains why in this example we can obtain differences
in behavior as implied by sequentially rational Bayesian assessments and
sequential equilibrium but only at unreached parts of the game tree. For
somewhat similar reasons, the same is also true when Player I’s action Out
is removed from the extensive-form.
The example in Figure 10 is quite different in nature. The ﬁve open
circles are the initial nodes, each of them is selected with equal probability
by Nature. Proposition 3 implies that in this extensive-form some Bayesian
assessment is not consistent. Those assessments must attach probability
zero to the two information sets of Player IV. That means that the actions
l1, r2, l3 and r4 have to be taken with probability one which leaves, for
instance, actions r1 and l2 as the two actions that Proposition 3 requires
for K = 2. (This corresponds to the carrier C∗ constructed in the proofs of
propositions 2 and 3.) In this example, consistent Beliefs can be arbitrary at
the bottom information set of Player IV but they imposes restrictions on the
setofconsistentbeliefsathertopinformationset. Bayesianbeliefscantake,
by deﬁnition, be arbitrary values at both information sets. Consider now
any game with that extensive-form. Whether or not actions actions l1, r2,
l3 and r4 are sequentially rational does not depend on what is the behavior
at the top information set of Player IV. The reason is that that information
set can only be reached from zero probability nodes at positive probability
information sets. This implies that if both information sets of Player IV
are reached with probability zero the strategy part of a sequentially rational
Bayesian assessment and a sequential equilibrium strategy may only difer
in behavior at Player IV’s top information set. However, behavior at that
information set cannot affect the sequential equilibrium path.
It seems, however, that these extensive-forms are rather particular and
that, although this is difﬁcult to characterize in any precise manner, if con-
sistent assessments strictly reﬁne Bayesian assessments then, typically, a
payoff vector exists such that sequential equilibrium generates a smaller
set of outcomes as compared to that generated by sequentially rational
Bayesian assessments. See footnotes 14 and 15 for some examples. For
another example, assign payoff (1,1,1,) after Out in the extensive-form
of Figure 3. Then from left to right (2,0,1), (0,1,0), (2,1,0), (0,0,1),
(0,0,1), and(0,0,0). Theoutcome(1,1,1)canbesupportedatheBayesian
assessment where players I and II play (Out,l2) and Player III puts a belief
equal to one to the center node of her information set. Similar examples can





























The proofs of the propositions and of Theorem 1 are valid for slightly
stronger results that have the potential of being more useful in applications.
If we have some information about a sequential equilibrium candidate, such
as its carrier, the outcome that it induces, or just some set of choices that
are to be taken with positive probability, then we can apply the results tak-
ing advantage of that information. That is, in applications, no longer do
we need to ﬁnd one behavioral strategy proﬁle to check whether or not ev-
ery Bayesian assessment is consistent. Instead we can simply focus on a
particular family of proﬁles of interest. Consider the following results.
Proposition 1’. Take an extensive-form without proper subforms and a set
of actions B ⊂ A. If we can ﬁnd a carrier C that contains the set B and an
information set h with two nodes x and y such that
(i) the information set h is included in X0(C); and
(ii) there is an action ¯ a ∈ P(x)∩P(y) with ¯ a / ∈C.
Then there exists a behavioral strategy proﬁle s with C ⊂ C(s) such that
some Bayesian assessment (s,m) is not consistent.
Proposition 3’. Take an extensive-form without proper subforms and a set
of actions B ⊂ A. If we can ﬁnd a carrier C that contains the set B and
K information sets h1,...,hK, where each information set hi contains two
nodes xi and yi, such that
(i) the information set hi is included in X0(C); and
(ii) there is an action ¯ ai ∈ P(xi)∩P(xi+1) with ¯ ai / ∈C.
Then there exists a behavioral strategy proﬁle s with C ⊂ C(s) such that
some Bayesian assessment (s,m) is not consistent.27
To see why these results hold, notice that the proofs of the propositions
start by selecting one arbitrary element out of a set where we allowed any
carrier satisfying the conditions in the proposition. If we restrict that orig-
inal set (but always allowing it to contain “bigger” carriers) then the proof
goes through without modiﬁcations.
The proof of Theorem 1 ﬁxes an arbitrary carrier and then asks if every
strategy with that carrier is consistent. Hence, the following also holds:
Theorem 1’. Take an extensive-form without proper subforms and a set of
actions B ⊂ A for which the conditions in propositions 1’ and 3’ are not
satisﬁed. For every strategy s with B ⊂ C(s) every Bayesian assessment
(s,m) is consistent.
Inourexamples, theseresultsimplythatinﬁgures3,5,7and8, ifPlayerI
does not move Out in the strategy of the Bayesian assessment (s,m) then
(s,m) is consistent. Likewise, if (s,m) is a Bayesian assessment in Fig-
ure 6 such that Player I does not move (F1,F2) then (s,m) is consistent.
To conclude, we have disentangled the different restrictions on beliefs
imposed by consistency at zero probability information sets. Some restric-
tions apply to a single information set in isolation (Proposition 1) and some
other restrictions apply to K different information sets when considered all
together (Proposition 3). That is, if the conditions of Proposition 3 are sat-
isﬁed for K information sets and not for any K′ < K then we can choose
arbitrary beliefs at K−1 of those information sets but this would, for some
behavioral strategy proﬁle, restrict consistent beliefs at the remainder infor-
mation set. Moreover, these propositions are necessary and sufﬁcient. This
can help establish similar results between sequentiality and stronger restric-
tions on assessments that ask for more than simply Bayesian updating.
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